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The growing demand for food owing to population growth has led to an increased need for fishery resources. Governments worldwide have introduced individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems to manage the resource depletion crisis. However, grandfathered quotas are a potential rent for fisherpersons, leading to rent seeking through lobbying. This rent seeking could exacerbate the resource conservation function of the ITQ system. Even if stock levels are restored through ITQs, the fish processing industry discharges sewage during the production process, leading to resource deterioration. In the blue economy, where various economic actors are involved with the ocean, what measures should be implemented to achieve sustainable fisheries? To respond to this challenge, this study analyzes the effects of reduced catch quotas and fishing seasons on fishery resources, economic growth, and welfare in an R&D-based growth model with processed fish products, considering rent seeking for ITQs. Fish damage parameter measures the magnitude of the impact of fishing on stock deterioration. This parameter increase, catch quota reductions that initially promoted economic growth begin to harm stock recovery. Shortening the fishing season leads to a trade-off between economic growth and stock recovery and to deterioration of welfare. Hence, it is difficult to achieve a sustainable fishery by simply reducing ITQs and fishing seasons. This study suggests that, when counterintuitive measures are taken to raise the fishery damage parameter somewhat, lowering the substantial ITQ increases the likelihood of achieving a sustainable fishery.