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This paper will examine four crises that took place between India and Pakistan, in the period in which they were declared nuclear powers. It shows that by combining threats and reassurance, Indian leaders sought to avert nuclear use, while deriving strategic and diplomatic gains from the presence of nuclear weapons. While scholars differ as to whether India-Pakistan crises should be termed “nuclear crises”, this paper asks instead how one state – India – behaves during crises, simultaneously drawing attention to, and downplaying its nuclear dimensions. The first section of the paper explains the role of reassurance in the complex game of deterrence. The second section provides a brief summary of the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship. The four crises are analyzed in the third section. Each crisis is first summarized, and the words and deeds that New Delhi chose to signal reassurance are highlighted. The fourth and final section evaluates whether the nuclear danger can be thus managed through the calibration of threat and reassurance. It identifies three factors that impede signals of reassurance, and cautions that the balance between threat and reassurance is too delicate to be relied on to keep the peace between India and Pakistan.