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The United States’ decision to stop enforcing, selectively, the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims (which also exempted the Federation between Bosnia and Croacia) in November 1994 helped change, then, the military, political and social dynamics of the war by a) indirectly allowing for a balancing of military capabilities to take place in the region and b) directly sending a message to the allies in NATO that the US was intent on achieving more decision-making autonomy regarding the United Nation’s resolutions and its allies’ stances toward Bosnia. Whereas the decision satisfied the US domestic political expectations of not getting bogged down militarily in Bosnia and demonstrated a pragmatic approach toward ethnicbased conflicts in Europe, it did not meet with approval from many of the NATO allies and other countries in the European Union. On the other hand, the US decision may havefound support in those countries belonging to the Organization of the Islamic Conference.The decision, which took place during a Congressional election year, was the outcome of a national debate about the United States’ political and military role and responsability in post-Cold War Europe. This decision pit the influences and the strategically wider or longer-term objectives of the Defense and State Departments and the National Security Council, and most importantly, those part of the agenda directed by a rather disengaged (initially) and less persuasive President Clinton (foreign policy-wise regarding Bosnia) inhis second year in the White House, against the punctual, diverse objectives and expectations of a more opportunistic Congress set on pressuring the President.