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<div>Kant considered pure reason to be transcendentally free in its legislative ability. &nbsp;I argue that this&nbsp;transcendental freedom is consistent with an naturalist ontologythat recognizes the existence only of&nbsp;objects in space and time. &nbsp;I show that Kant is committed to the natural faculty of empirical reason</div><div>which would function as part of the natural causal order. &nbsp;I then argue that pure reason is the structure,&nbsp;discovered by transcendental arguments, of that same faculty. &nbsp; The structure of pure reason is embodied&nbsp;in particular instances of empirical reason. &nbsp;Transcendental freedom of pure reason is the fact that its&nbsp;structure is determined independently of the causal order &mdash; in the case of pure practical reason, by</div><div>means of arguments about the very possibility of deliberative action &mdash; and this structure contributes to&nbsp;the causal order by means of the causal efficacy of empirical reason. &nbsp;I then discuss the effect this view&nbsp;has on the question of whether Kant is a moral realist</div>