The behavior strategies between the government and power generation enterprises considering the learning mechanism based on evolutionary game

oleh: Jiao Jianling, Sun He, Yang Ranran

Format: Article
Diterbitkan: EDP Sciences 2019-01-01

Deskripsi

The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) as a policy tool to promote renewable energy development has gone through more than ten years in China. In order to research the strategic interaction between governments and power generation enterprises under the background of energy system transformation and upgrading, a learning mechanism was introduced based on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, and an evolutionary game model between the government and power generation enterprises was established. The results showed that the evolutionary stability strategy depended on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, which is conducive to the gradual stability of the system. The existence of learning mechanism not only reduced the cost of wind power, but also reduced the probability of government supervision.