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The work of Pierre-Yves Raccah is characterized by great precision and rigour; this is well illustrated by the terminological distinction he has established between natural language (such as French or English), and formal language as employed by logicians. The statements in a natural language are generally “phrases”, which means that their interpretation is always a matter for negotiation and depends strongly on the contextual situation. By contrast, the statements in a formal language take the form of logical propositions, which apparently possess only a single interpretation – although, it may be pointed out, this appearance actually depends on a very particular context, that constructed by the community of logicians. This distinction can be difficult for English-speaking persons to grasp, because in English there is only one word – “language” – whereas in French there are two, “langue” and “langage”.Raccah (2011) has deployed this important distinction in an important article which constitutes the focal point of this contribution. Raccah presents a precisely structured argument to the effect that “metaphors do not exist”. The reason is that in natural language, all the words are normally metaphors; it follows that a “metaphor”, as a distinctive figure of speech which calls for explanation, does indeed not exist. In my contribution, I propose to present a complementary approach, taking as framework the paradigm of Enaction in Cognitive Science, which comes to essentially the same conclusion. Finally, I propose to formulate a new question which arises if one considers that “metaphors” are normal: this concerns the status of “literal statements” which, by an irony of fate consequent on a reversal of the situation, become in their turn problematical.