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This paper explores the impact of risk preference as well as interlinked credit and insurance contract on peasants’ new technology adoption. The results show that (1) risk preference has a significant impact on peasants’ adoption of innovative seeds, and the influence of exact probabilistic risk preference on peasants’ adoption of innovative seeds is greater than that of ambiguous probabilistic risk preference. (2) Interlinked credit and insurance contract has a significant positive impact on peasants’ adoption of innovative seeds, and interlinked credit and insurance contract plays a moderating role in promoting peasants’ adoption of innovative seeds. (3) Peasants’ education level, the degree of land fragmentation, the proportion of grain cultivation in the household-cultivated land, whether to provide meteorological disaster warning services, and the distance to financial services also have a significant impact on peasants’ adoption of innovative seeds. This interplay between collateral and the nature of credit-insurance interlinkage has direct and important implications for the design of programs to boost the adoption of innovative agricultural technologies simultaneously, and sheds light upon how the government can formulate relevant policies to promote innovative technological development.